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Internationalisation is a process that MNCs have to engage in 
becoming global players. This process enables them to be mature in 
their operations in foreign markets and strengthen their competitive 
position abroad. The current trend has witnessed the surge of MNCs 
not only from developed nations but also from developing nations 
that actively involve in the global economy. The process of 
internationalisation take place among MNCs from developed 
economies are also experienced by firms from developing 
economies, however the pattern of the process is slightly different. 
This study explored the internationalisation process of MNC from 
Malaysia, namely TM Berhad, a leading telecommunication company 
in the country. Its motives, expansion strategies and entry mode 
chosen in setting up its operations abroad are deeply analyzed. This 
study discovered that internationalisation process that Malaysian firm 
experienced is not similar to the internationalisation process that are 
discussed in the literature which were based on firms from developed 
economies. TM as a government linked firms internationalise by 
utilizing its ownership advantages as other MNCs, but the efforts 
were more driven by opportunities and government linkages rather 
than other factors. 
 




Internationalisation is an utmost important factor for firms to grow and develop 
economically and technologically. Firms from developing countries nowadays 
are also actively participating in foreign direct investment to reap the benefits  
of globalisation. Developing countries multinational corporations (MNCs) are 
becoming important in the global economy as their foreign direct investment 
becomes remarkable in recent years. In 2004, Asia and Oceania contributed 
more than four-fifths of outward FDI from developing countries (UNCTAD, 
2005). This phenomenon reflects that developing country Asian firms have 
succeeded in global market places, and have elevated its status from 
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domestic market players to become global players. Singapore-based firms for 
instance are expanding their business opportunities to the global market and 
Malaysia is following this trend, increasing its presence remarkably not only in 
Southeast Asia but also other parts of the world.   Rapid technological 
change, economic integration, convergence of consumer tastes and 
increased worldwide competition are among factors that motivate Malaysian 
firms to engage in internationalisation process. Malaysia was at 32nd position 
for the periods of 2003-2005 among the 128 economies worldwide (UNCTAD, 
2006).  This indicates that the Malaysia’s participation in outward foreign 
direct investment in the global market is apparent and significant. Hence, 
there is an important interface between the micro level (firm specific) issues 
and the macro level (country specific) issues in Malaysian firms’ 
internationalisation. 
 
2. Malaysian MNCs and Investment  
 
Currently, flow of outward direct investment from Malaysia has increased 
significantly, reflecting the emergence of a growing cohort of Malaysian 
multinational companies.  In terms of the host economies for Malaysian 
investment abroad, Singapore was the largest recipient during 1992-1996. 
After the 1997 crisis, the United States emerged as the largest host economy 
for the period of 2000-2001.  At present, the share accruing to other ASEAN 
economies has also increased, over time.  Within ASEAN, beside Singapore, 
Indonesia also received an increasing share of Malaysian investment until 
1996. Overseas investment from Malaysia was led by the oil and gas and 
service sectors, followed by the manufacturing, agriculture and construction 
sectors (Asia Pacific M&A Bulletin, 2005). A government-linked corporations 
(GLCs), Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Petronas), was named as one of the top 
50 non-financial MNCs from developing countries including FELDA, KL 
Kepong, Kumpulan Guthrie Berhad and Sime Darby Berhad. Investment in 
manufacturing were largely for the manufacturing of fabricated metal 
products, machinery and equipment (including electronic and electrical 
products), palm oil, wood and wood-based products. 
 
The study on firms’ internationalisation process within the Malaysia context is 
significant from a number of perspectives. First, there is limited studies 
conducted on internationalisation of Southeast Asian firms, most of the 
studies did not represent phenomenon of Malaysia. Second, the Malaysia 
economy as in other developing countries is driven by firm business 
operations and therefore, governments within these countries are keen to 
grow and expand its internationalisation potential (Sim, 2005). Third, 
Malaysian firms are growing at fast rate and they are viewed as vehicles of 
innovation, employment, social and cultural regeneration (Tham, 1998; 
Ragayah, 1999 and Sim, 2005). Hence, this paper attempts to explore the 
emergence and evolution of Malaysian pioneer telecommunication 
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multinational – TM Berhad. This study focuses on the evolutionary pattern of 
this corporation. 
 
3. Background of Industry and Firm (TM Berhad) 
 
The telecommunications industry is typically considered as consisting of two 
main elements: the provision of services or network operators, and the supply 
of equipment. In the Malaysian telecommunications industry, the strongest 
and most influential domestic telecommunication firms are fixed-line and 
mobile network operators (Interview: 11 October 2004). Equipment 
manufacturers play a relatively restricted role compared to service providers.  
 
The country’s telecommunication sector has undergone consolidation with the 
original eight telco players subsequently being reduced to four companies, 
namely, Telekom Malaysia Berhad (TM Berhad), Maxis Communications 
Berhad, DiGi.Com Berhad, and Time dotcom Berhad. The consolidation was 
made due to the financial crisis that swept through Southeast Asia in 1996/97, 
when concerns over market saturation and infrastructure duplication with 
large-scale debt and negative equity hit the industry (Salazar, 2004). 
Consolidation was also made due to merger and acquisition of some firms to 
strengthen their position in the domestic market. Among the four telcos, TM 
Berhad remains the most internationally active, with the furthest international 
reach. In the event of empirical research, TM Berhad has operations and 
financial interests in 11 countries namely Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, South 
Africa, Malawi, Guinea, Cambodia, Ghana, Thailand, and more recently is 
India, Pakistan and Indonesia (Interviews: 5 October 2004; 11 October 2004). 
 
In domestic market, the key operating revenue derived from fixed line 
businesses and cellular operations, data services, Internet and multimedia. 
TM Retail which began operations in July 2004 (formerly known as TM Telco) 
is a core business unit of TM. It responsible to manage and operate fixed line 
telephony and data based products and services in the country. Apart from 
building its domestic expansion and being less reliant on the competitive local 
market, TM has spread its wings and invested in several international 
projects. The group has taken further steps to raise overseas investment to 
contribute to group earnings. In line with TM’s vision of becoming a global 
communications player, TM International Sendirian Berhad (TMI) was 
established in June 1992 as a subsidiary for international investment and 
managing the overseas investment activities. With the establishment of TMI, 
TM Berhad has some assurance of the effective management of its 
international investments, thus maintaining high standards of operation and 
management in the interest of value creation for the group. TMI aims to 
strategically expand internationally and capitalize opportunities in emerging 
markets, particularly in Asia and Africa.  
 
 





3.1. Internationalisation Theories and MNCs 
 
The Uppsala model of internationalisation indicates that firms exhibit an 
evolutionary process, gradually internationalising in an incremental manner 
through a series of evolutionary ‘stages’ (Johanson and Vahlne, 1990). Firms 
were presumed to begin their international activities via exporting by targeting 
‘psychically close’ countries, and through confidence, accumulation of 
business knowledge and acquisition of international experience, firms 
committed greater resources and begin to target countries more ‘psychically 
distant’. The Uppsala model emphasised the importance of gaining 
knowledge and experience about the characteristics of foreign markets along 
the internationalisation path, leading to reduced levels of uncertainty in 
unfamiliar foreign environments before investing. This ‘stage’ view of 
internationalisation has found support in the international expansion of firms 
from developing countries (see for example, Wiedersheim-Paul et al., 1978). 
The need to accumulate knowledge and experience through the learning 
process become more logical for developing country MNCs where lack of 
superior technology seems to be the biggest disadvantage in their 
internationalisation process. 
 
Although the internationalisation theory provides a plausible explanation and 
has been respected as axiomatic in explaining the internationalisation 
expansion of firms, the theory has weathered various criticisms and 
disagreements. The main limitation is the small number of cases in the 
pioneer study of internationalisation process of firms; as a result, the findings 
are confined to the Scandinavian environment only. Zander (1994) stressed 
that some firms, especially those with large resources, do not necessarily 
follow any consistent pattern in their international expansion. Firms can ‘leap-
frog’ stages and transfer learning from one market to another (Benito and 
Gripsrud, 1992). Zahra and George (2002) and Anderson (1993) further 
added that the popularity of the concept is inconsistent with empirical and 
theoretical evidence. On the theoretical level, Reid (1981), Strandskov (1986), 
and Turnbull (1987), criticised the theory as being too deterministic and 
mechanistic in nature, in the sense that it assumes that the progress of 
internationalisation is in linear fashion from one stage to another. Indeed, the 
model has been accused of being descriptive rather than explanatory 
(Turnbull, 1987). Anderson (1993) on the other hand made the criticism that 
the theory failed to take other firm-specific factors into account. Moreover, 
there is no attempt to explain the mechanism by which a firm proceeds from 
one stage to the next. Recent empirical findings show that firms are in a 
particular ‘state’ of internationalisation which can be subject to both backward 
and forward momentum, instead of progressing in an incremental fashion 
through stages (Burgel and Murrey, 2000). 
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Researchers have provided further empirical evidence that shows that firms 
do not always start with occasional exporting and ending up with a production 
facilities abroad (Hedlund and Kverneland, 1985; Oviatt and McDougall, 
1994). The theory also explains the current behaviour of firms in the dynamic 
business environment insufficiently, i.e. the impact of global economy, and 
high technology (Axinn, and Matthyssens, 2002). Hirch and Meshulach (1991) 
further argued that in explaining the internationalisation process, the Uppsala 
model focuses more on the firm’s internal resources (market knowledge and 
experience from foreign activities), and completely ignores other external 
factors such as market potential and competitive conditions. Blomstermo and 
Sharma (2003) have pointed out that there is a lack of operationalisation of 
important dimensions in the related theory. Thus, many of the basic 
assumptions about the process remain controversial, untested, and largely 
un-investigated. This point was similarly stressed by Christensen (1991), 
Johanson and Vahlne (1990), and Bonaccorsi (1992). According to Hadjikhani 
(1997), critiques of the internationalisation process can be divided into two 
groups: first, concerning the empirical validity of the stage theory, and second, 
concerning the theoretical underpinning of the model. Finally, the argument 
against the stages process stems from the emergence of the ‘born global’ 
firms theory as proposed by Oviatt and McDougall (1994). According to the 
‘born global’ theory, growing global competition and accelerating 
technological development are now forcing firms to internationalise more 
rapidly (in some cases from the beginning) without necessarily following an 
incremental process. These firms are, by theoretical definition, international 
(or ‘born global’) almost from inception (Madsen and Servais, 1997).  
 
However, despite the various criticisms cited, it is important to note that the 
internationalisation process theory remains a valuable reference when 
investigating and examining the internationalisation process of nascent MNCs 
from developing countries, most of which are small and new to the 
international business environment. Their internationalisation expansion – at 
first glance – apparently does depend on knowledge gained and experience 
of foreign markets. Thus, an understanding of extant theory is required as 
these firms do follow a similar developmental approach – a gradualist relying 
on internationalisation knowledge and experience, and also technological 
competence in their growth and expansion. However, there is still a paucity of 
literature in relation to multinational corporations (MNC’s) emerging from 
developing or underdeveloped nations. Plainly, these companies tend to be 
few and far between hence a research approach using qualitative inductive 












This study employs a case study research method to examine a single firm’s 
learning and internationalisation process. The research design requires an 
exploratory case study drawing upon multiple units of analysis (Yin, 1994). 
The main data collection method was a series of in-depth interviews with 
senior managers in order to develop the case study as relying on a single 
source of information would be inappropriate. Therefore multiple sources of 
evidence, including both primary and secondary data, including internal 
unpublished documentation, internal brochures, archival records, internet web 
sites, company annual reports, company newsletters, newspaper clippings, 
magazines and other sources (published and unpublished materials) (Punch, 
1998; Yin, 1989) were also collected in order to construct the case and to 
increase validity. 
 
5. Research Findings 
 
TM Berhad expansion has been restricted to countries with which the 
Malaysian government has good or at least neutral relations. TMI’s strategy is 
to target emerging high growth markets with low penetration rates (Interview: 
1 October 2004). Most of TM’s international investments were made in the 
mid-1990s. They were initially prudently restricted to markets nearer home. 
The relative proximity and in most cases a cultural affinity provides some 
comfort (Interviews: 5 October 2004, 11 October 2004). To date, TMI has 
investments in South Africa, Guinea and Malawi in the African continent. 
Nearer in the region are Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, Cambodia, Indonesia 
and Thailand. This evidence shows that the technology of TM consists of 
assimilating and adapting foreign technologies rather pushing back the 
frontiers of knowledge. At the time of conducting the empirical research in the 
organisation, TM Berhad had investment in 11 countries. However, based on 
2006 data from TMI, there are several new investments were made. Table 1 
shows details of TMI’s international investments. Most of the projects initiated 
were in the region and in collaboration with the dominant local partners, 
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Table 1:  
TM International Investment Ventures (Subsidiaries and Associate 
Companies) 
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40% - Government of 
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s.a (national 
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70% - Government of 
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Communications LLC to 
acquired TSA (total 15%); 
6% - TM 
Dialog Telekom 
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in MTN Networks 






Joint Venture 30% - AK Khan & Co. Ltd 
(a leading Bangladesh 
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Corp. Public Co. Ltd from 








40% - Malawi 
Telecommunications Ltd 






Shareholder 59.7% - TM, 16.8% - 
Khazanah, 7.4% (AIF 
Indonesia Ltd), 16.0% 
(PT Telekomindo 
Primabhakti), 0.1% 
(Employees & Public) 
MobileOne Limited Singapore 
(August 2005) 
 
Joint Venture 29.79% - SunShare. 
Sunshare Investments 
Ltd is a consortium in 
which TMI holds 80%; 
Khazanah 20% 
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Table 1 (continued):  










Joint Venture Agreement between TMI 
and Technology 
Resources Industries – to 
transfer MTCE equity 













Joint venture 49% - TMI; 51% - Mcorp 
Global 
Source: TM International, 2006  
 
The first international investment of TMI began in 1995, when the group 
expanded its operations internationally in the Sri Lankan market. MTN 
Networks (Pvt) Limited (MTN) was set up to establish, operate and maintain 
the GSM cellular services utilising the 900 MHz frequency band. The 
Government of Sri Lanka awarded the licensing agreement to the TMI for a 
period of 18 years until 2013. The success of the early international venture 
motivated the group to pursue its international expansion activities vigorously 
during 1995-1997. In December 1995, the group formed a strategic 
partnership with the Government of Guinea (GOG) to form Societe Des 
Telecommunications De Guinee (Sotelgui S. A). Telekom Malaysia acquired 
60% equity in Sotelgui S.A, amounting to a value of US$45 million, while 
GOG owns the remaining 40%. The investment is focused on Government-to-
Government collaboration (Interview: 11 October 2004). However, in 
December 2005, TM Berhad has announced to draw its investment in Guinea 
in relation to group strategy to more focus in ASEAN countries. 
 
In the following year, TMI expanded its operation in Calcutta, India, holding a 
37.7% share in Usha Marting Telekom Limited. Having begun its operation in 
September 1995, the group was given a licence to install and operate a GSM 
cellular network in the country under the brand name, COMMAND. The stake, 
however, was sold in October 2000 for US$130 million, to Hutchinson. The 
main reason for Telekom’s withdrawal from India was the restricted coverage 
given to it, which, as a result, would have capped its growth (Interview: 1 
October 2004, Malaysian Business, 1 August 2004). Another investment of 
TMI in the African continent is in Malawi. The group formed a joint-venture 
company with the Government-owned Malawi Telecommunications Limited 
(MTL) in 1995 to form Telekom Networks Malawi Limited (TNM). Telekom 
Malaysia holds 60% equity while MTL holds the remaining 40%. The rationale 
for investment of the group is in line with the Malaysian Government’s call to 
local companies to form strategic alliances with foreign parties (Padayachee 
and Valodia, 2002). In 1996, the group further expanded its ventures to 
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Bangladesh where TMI and A.K Khan Group (a leading Bangladesh Business 
Group) entered into a joint venture to formed TM International (Bangladesh) 
Limited (TMIB). The former holds a 70% stake in this joint venture while the 
latter holds the remaining 30%. The company commenced commercial 
operations in November 1997 and was granted a 15-year license, renewable 
annually thereafter, to develop and operate an extensive nationwide Dialog 
GSM cellular service on 900 Mhz frequency band in the country, under the 
brand name AKTEL.  
 
The group’s international ventures to Thailand began in 1997 when the 
company acquired a 24.99% stake in SAMART Corporation, a public listed 
company in Thailand. It also bought a 33.33% in Digital Phone Company 
(DPC), a Samart subsidiary for US$135 million (RM337.5 million) with the 
commitment to buy new DPC shares at US$45 million (RM112.5 million) to 
bring the total stake to 40%. TMI’s principal partner in Samart is the Vilailuck 
family, one of the country’s successful entrepreneurs, with a 48.73% 
shareholding in the company. The partnership is the first step in creating a 
regional telecommunications infrastructure to rival all others in the global 
market (The Edge, 16 June, 1997). Similar to India, the group’s investment in 
Thailand with DPC was disposed of in year 2001 for US$245 million, resulting 
in an exceptional gain of RM827.8 million for the group. This was due to the 
nature of the competitive markets and restricted coverage given, which limited 
opportunities to expand in that country (Interview: 5 October 2004). The major 
and most profitable international project made by the group was in South 
Africa. The investment took place in 1997. TMI invested in Telkom South 
Africa (TSA) through its consortium with South Western Bell Corporation 
(SBC Communications Inc.) of the United States through Thintana 
Communication LLC. The purchase of a 30% stake in Telekom SA Ltd by TM 
is reported to be closely linked to the Malaysian utility’s policy of investing in 
developing countries to overcome competitive pressures in its own domestic 
telecommunications industry. It is the largest investment in Africa by a 
Malaysian company (Business Report, 27 March 1997).  
 
TM’s investment in South Africa may be part of a strategy to further penetrate 
the African continent. Telkom SA Ltd and TM are seeking to expand in Africa, 
where telecommunications privatisations are under way in Uganda, Senegal, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Business Day, 
17 September 1997). As strategic equity partners, the two companies jointly 
hold a 30% stake in TSA. By June 2004, the company reported an 
exceptional gain of RM 640 million from the partial sale of its stake in Telkom 
SA South Africa. Thintana disposed of a 14.9% stake in Telkom SA 
comprising 82.99 million shares for 6.06 billion rand (RM3.54 million). With 
the stake sale, Thintana’s interest in Telkom SA has been reduced from 30% 
to 15.1% (Interview: 1 October 2004; The Star, 22 Jun 2004). Thintana is 60% 
owned by SBC and 40% by TM. Therefore, Telekom’s effective stake in 
Telkom SA Ltd was reduced from 12% to 6% (Interview: 1 October 2004). 
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Telekom’s portion of the sale was 33.19 million shares, amounting to 2.42 
billion rand (The Sun, 21 Jun 2004). On 15 November 2004, TMI sold its 
remaining 6% to South African Black Empowerment Consortium. The 
disposal resulted in an exceptional gain of RM1, 515.2 million for the financial 
end 2004 which contributed to the group profit. When TM first announced its 
intention to reduce its stake in the South African company, it raised some 
doubts, as the latter was achieving excellent results. However, it is believed 
that the move signalled a strategy to move away from a market reaching 
saturation point and reallocate investments to areas that promise higher 
growth potential. The partial disposal is in line with Telekom’s move to 
consolidate its strategic investment overseas and focus on markets closer to 
Malaysia, especially in the Asia-Pacific region (The Sun, 21 Jun 2004). 
Moving to the Asia-Pacific region would be a positive step for TM considering 
the good growth potential in those countries (Malaysian Business, 1 August, 
2004). 
 
Apart from South Africa, Malaysian Telekom also bought a 30% stake in 
Ghana Telekom in 1997. TM was part of G-Com; a consortium (which 
includes African Communications Group, Western Wireless and Ghana 
National Petroleum Company) led by the Telekom group and the Government 
of Ghana (70%). The group acquired 30% equity in GT for US$38 million in 
February 1997 governed by a Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement. GT had 
been a profitable telecommunications provider even before its privatisation. 
The company recorded a profit of US$14 million in 1997 and US$3 million 
before the privatisation (Malaysian Business, 1 August 2004). In August 2000, 
TM signed an agreement to acquire an additional 15% for US$100 million. 
The investments in Ghana, however, did not meet expectations, and in July 
2001, only four and the half years after the start of operation, TM lost 
management control in GT after the Government of Ghana ‘unilaterally 
terminated’ the employment contract of the managing director and appointed 
an interim management committee to oversee day to day affairs. Telekom’s 
management of GT became a contentious issue during the elections and the 
contract was not renewed when it expired in February 2002. The new 
government under the New Patriotic Party led by John Kufuor had chosen 
Norway’s Telenor to replace Telekom Malaysia as the strategic investor to 
improve GT’s network. In late 2002, Telekom withdrew its investment in 
Ghana, ‘as it can no longer protect its investment’ (Interview: 1 October 2004; 
Malaysian Business, 1 August 2004). The disposal of the GT stake is 
Telekom’s third exit from its strategic investments overseas after India and 
Thailand in 2001, due to the nature of the competitive markets in those 
countries. 
 
The Asian financial crisis in 1996/7 forced the group to slow down its 
international expansion. The group’s growth in profit before taxation 
decreased to 70.8% or RM702.3 millions compared to RM2, 404.5 millions in 
1996. It was forced to defer some of its proposed overseas ventures. The 
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group has concentrated on cost reduction through various measures. For 
example, Telekom investment in Cambodia in 1998 only began its 
commercial operations in 1999. The group acquired a 51% stake in Cambodia 
Samart Communications Co. Ltd (CASACOM), the remaining 49% being held 
by Samart Corporation Public Company Limited (‘SAMART’), a Thai 
communications company. As part of its plan to increase its revenue from 
overseas ventures and be less reliant on the domestic market, the group 
announced its entry into Indonesia and re-entry to the Indian market at the 
end of 2004, thereby establishing a strong regional presence. In 2004 TMI 
targeted new core investments in a bid to strengthen its presence closer to 
home. In Indonesia, TMI reached an agreement with the Rajawali Group, the 
principal shareholders of PT Excelcomindo Pratama (XL), to acquire 
Indonesia’s third largest mobile operator, which was duly completed on 11 
January 2005. 
 
In India, the group revisited the country with renewed vigour when it formed a 
joint venture with Singapore Technologies Telemedia (STT) to buy shares 
equity in IDEA Cellular, the leading cellular operator in India to operate 
cellular services with a subscriber base of over 4.5 million (Utusan Malaysia, 
27 November, 2004). Both parties have entered into a definitive agreement to 
acquire a 47.7% stake in IDEA Cellular for a total consideration of 
approximately US$390 million (US$1 = RM3.80). The joint venture with STT 
would further improve TMI’s ability to compete in the increasingly competitive 
global mobile telecoms market (Malaysian Business, 1 August 2004). The 
proposed investment is consistent with the objectives of ST Telemedia and 
TM International: to become significant wireless players in the Asian markets; 
and to participate in the growth opportunities in the Indian cellular market. 
Telekom has also indicated its interest in Pakistan telco. The Government of 
Pakistan, which owns an 88% stake in Pakistan Telecommunications 
Corporation (PTC), intends to sell its shares of 26% sometime in June 2005. 
According to various sources, TM is now currently in the process of 
conducting studies and extensive due diligence in considering this venture 
(Utusan Malaysia, 5 February 2005). Pakistan is being considered for TMI 
investment, as it able to provide a window of opportunity into the Middle 
Eastern market.  
 
From the interviews seven primary factors have been identified to motivate 
the firm in their internationalisation process: globalisation of industry and 
commerce, reducing of trading barriers, privatisation, competition, regulation 
asymmetry, new telecom technologies and political needs. 
 
TM International Sdn Bhd is poised to expand its foreign investments with 
greater confidence and contribute further to the financial performance of the 
group. The internationalisation made extra demands on the management 
(Interview: 5 October 2004). TM International will seek selective new markets 
abroad with teledensity below the average levels in the ASEAN and South 
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Asian region. The company now has re-strategise its international 
investments to focus on regional markets closer to home (The Star, 12 
December 2004). It can be seen as an adjustment to new international 
strategy. Potential new markets include those in Indonesia, Myanmar, 
Cambodia and Vietnam in South East Asia and India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
Iran, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka in the South Asian region. The 
company’s core focus in the international market will be on the provision of 




In reviewing the internationalisation process models (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977; Bilkey and Tesar, 1977; Cavusgil, 1980, 1984; Czinkota, 1982; and 
Reid, 1983), knowledge and experience of internationalisation is a prominent 
factor in the internationalisation process of firms. The models rest on the 
assumption that firms have imperfect access to information and explain 
internationalisation as a process of increasing experiential knowledge. The 
firm increases its commitment incrementally as it learns about international 
markets. This is manifested in a sequence of operational forms labelled the 
establishment chain. Firms expand internationally only after having 
accumulated some forms of ownership advantages based on higher 
technological capability or internationalisation knowledge and experience. 
 
The international expansion of TM, however, does not quite fit the above 
explanation, and poses challenges to the internationalisation literature. First, it 
remains to be seen that the international expansion of the firm during 1994–
97 is merely based on opportunistic impulse, primarily through South-South 
Co-operation and exploitation of bilateral trade relations rather than 
incremental investment processes led by exporting activities. Second, it has 
been seen that TM’s knowledge about and experience of internationalisation 
is limited. Although the group’s emergence was built on its vast knowledge 
about the telecommunications industry, its capability was more focused on its 
domestic market. Its first foreign direct investment only took place in 1995, 
and it initially expanded overseas via growing South-South economic links. 
Therefore, business networks considerations appear to be a major 
determinant of TM’s upsurge in foreign direct investment. Third, in selecting 
entry mode strategy, TM prefers to have a majority ownership with 
management control rather than following a series of resource commitment 
stages in the entry-mode literature (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). Fourth, 
TM’s status as a GLC in the home market invites attention to how the firm 
used its ‘brand name and reputation’ as a specific ownership advantage in the 
international market.  
 
This study highlighted that Telekom’s international investment reflected an 
opportunistic attempt to reap the benefits of new market opportunities. When 
the telecommunication industry in the developing countries was opened up 
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due to the pressure of globalisation and market liberalisation, the firm took 
this opportunity to invest internationally, in line with Mahathir’s promotion of 
South-south relations (Interview: 11 October 2004). Through the Malaysia 
Government, TM has been invited to spread its business abroad primarily to 
other developing countries. TM’s status as a GLC was the driving force in its 
regionalisation activities. Although it is contended that all the decisions of TM 
to invest abroad were made independently, and not at the request of the 
government, however, the process was facilitated by the government. Most of 
the early ventures relied on government-to-government arrangements. The 
quest for rewarding opportunities was evident in TM’s overseas ventures. The 
group has announced to expand abroad almost at the same time. Within the 
period of 1995-1997, the group invested in five foreign countries, namely, 
Republic of Guinea and Malawi (1995), Bangladesh (1996), Ghana and South 
Africa (1997). As suggested by Lecraw (1977), the desire to escape the 
constraints of a slow-growing domestic market motivated some developing-
country firms to move abroad. As for TM, the saturation of domestic market is 
one of the key reasons that motivate TM’s to search new opportunities abroad 
especially in other developing-country (Interview: 5 October 2004). It is 
therefore more accurate to explain TMI’s foreign investment as opportunity-
driven attempts to seek new markets abroad, where overseas investment 
criteria include the presence of democratic and developmental-oriented 
governments. The core investment activities are focused particularly on 
providing cellular network infrastructure and fixed-line operations. The group 
has focused its investment activity towards those lines of business where it 
already possessed domestic-derived skills and competencies (Interview: 1 
October 2004).  
 
The rapid international expansion of TMI’s made it necessary for the group to 
select reliable joint venture partners in the respective country. Due to TMI’s 
lack of internationalisation knowledge and experience, the selection of reliable 
local partners is extremely important with regard to providing local access, 
connection and knowledge of local market (Interview: 1 October 2004). In 
selecting the partners, the criteria differ from one to another, depending on 
the country where investment takes place. Among the most important criteria 
when choosing partners are; similarity of their business strategy to TMI; 
knowledgeable in technological know-how; financially sound; and able to add 
value to the venture which TM’s lacks (Interviews: 11 October 2004; 21 
October 2004). Like other national telcos in the country, TM’s reputation as a 
government-linked corporation (GLC) in the domestic market carries great 
weight in regard to its international expansion. This reputation reflects the 
group’s business stability and strength in the telecommunication industry.  
 
7. Entry Modes and Expansion Strategy 
 
The literature on developing country MNCs has consistently shown evidence 
that joint ventures with minority shares in the equity have been the preferred 
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mode of market entry (see also Donckels and Lambrecht, 1995; Lee and 
Beamish, 1995). This strong preference, however, does not necessarily apply 
to TMI’s international expansion strategy. Some of the firm’s foreign 
investments are through acquisition. For example, in January 2005, TMI 
acquired PT Excelcomindo Pratama in a quest to break into the Indonesian 
market. TMI also chooses to use joint venture with management control as an 
entry mode strategy for its international investment to sustain its long-term 
business strategy. The new acquisitions have provided TM with new scale of 
growth opportunities. Through acquisition, TM may gain access to new 
market opportunities, and obtain a local network of distribution and suppliers 
(Interview: 11 October 2004). Acquisitions will also enable TMI to increase 
synergy potential from its regional network given high traffic flows of voice and 
data, potential to share assets, purchasing leverage and improved risk 
management (Interview: 1 October 2004). The firm sought local partners who 
could provide necessary capabilities, i.e. knowledge of local markets and 
connections to national authorities. TMI compensated for its lack of contacts 
in foreign countries by finding local partners with the necessary contacts. For 
instance, TMI’s investment in countries such as Guinea, Ghana, Bangladesh, 
Thailand, Malawi, Pakistan and Indonesia was as a joint partner with 
government-linked companies in those countries. However, there are some 
cases where the partners in these countries were foreign telecommunication 
operators. For example, South Western Bell Corporation (SBC) was one of 
the partners in the South Africa investment, Samart Corporation of Thailand in 
the Cambodia venture, and Singapore Technologies Telemedia Pte Ltd in the 
Indian project.  
 
In recent years, the group has announced its intention to streamline its 
investment strategy abroad. TMI wants to strengthen its position in the Asian 
regional market (Interview: 21 October 2004). This decision was driven more 
by market factors to search for emerging high growth markets with low 
penetration rates. The group announced that it would enter markets closer to 
home with similar economic and cultural environments. By focusing on 
developing countries, the group could take full advantage of its know-how in 
telecommunications without much competition from either local or foreign 
competitors (Interview: 5 October 2004). Moreover, developing countries also 
offer more room for growth with a low penetration rate. For instance, a country 
like India was a promising area in which to invest. Compared to South Africa, 
the economic condition in India is growing very rapidly (Malaysian Business, 1 
August 2004). In explaining how the firm chose its entry mode strategy, its 
key executive stressed that the company often chooses joint ventures and 
greenfield operations as its main entering strategies (Interview: 5 October, 
2004). It has been the company’s policy to ensure that international 
investments are accompanied with active management participation and 
control. This is probably a reflection of increased internationalisation and 
knowledge experience and the gaining of confidence in its foreign operations 
in recent years. However, acquisition of strategic assets was not the only 
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reason behind TMI’s international ventures. The group was equally driven by 
its interest in targeting companies with listing potential (Interview: 11 October 
2004).  
 
The willingness of the group to focus on only a handful of investments 
demonstrates a developing country MNC are willing to face with greater risk 
of business. This contradicted with theories of the internationalisation and 
developing countries MNCs. TMI has not gradually built up its international 
portfolio of investments as suggested by Johanson and Vahle (1977), but in 
an aggressive manner of foreign direct investment. In doing so, TMI for 
instance, has formed strategic partnerships with major telecommunications 
companies in South Africa, Ghana and Guinea, Thailand, Sri Lanka, 
Bangladesh, Malawi, India and Indonesia. TM sought reliable local partners, 
typically domestic telecoms carriers capable of providing knowledge and 
connections for their operations. Finding a well-connected local partner in 
each market has benefited the group, particularly, in adapting locally in 
circumstances where TMI may lack knowledge experience. The partnerships 
also provide a way for TM to familiarise itself with the local market, so that 
subsequent investment decisions can be made on a better informed basis 
(Interview: 8 October 2004). The status of TM as a government-linked 
corporation has given the firm an advantage in terms of reputation, thus, 
facilitating the search for partners. Most of TMI strategic partners are also 
firms owned by the government in the country concerned. For example, in the 
Republic of Guinea, TM formed a joint venture with the local government to 
form Societe Des Telecommunications De Guinee. In Ghana, the group’s 
strategic partner is the Government of Ghana. Relying on the local 
government would benefit the group in terms of gaining knowledge and 
expertise to operate in the chosen market. When asked what role is played by 
TM in its international investments, a key executive of TMI stressed its 
contribution in technological expertise, maintaining network as well as 
financial support and management capability. However, these commitments 
vary from one country to another (Interview: 5 October 2004). TMI claimed 
that its technological skills, management capabilities, expertise and 
experience as a pioneer telco in Malaysia for more than fifty-five years were 
beneficial to its international joint ventures. TMI wants to be a strategic 
partner by bringing expertise that other partners may lack, as its investments 
are in the less developed countries, in addition to equity contribution. In order 
to continue maintaining its double-digit growth, the group plans to be more 
aggressive in its expansion plan (Interview: 5 October 2004).  
 
8. Conclusion and Implication 
 
This paper aims to explore the emergence and internationalisation pattern 
and process of a leading Malaysian telecommunication company and nascent 
MNC namely TM Berhad. The case study of TM Berhad has presented some 
interesting insights on the growth of the country’s major telecommunications 
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player, which has moved in a relatively short time from domestic 
telecommunications firm into an international player and nascent MNC. 
Undoubtedly, its status as government-linked corporation, had underpinned 
the group’s growth in the domestic market which was partly based on 
business network connections with the Malaysian government; although the 
group via its interviewees wished to claim its technological expertise was a 
major contributor. However, TM’s exploitation of these extensive relationships 
is understandable; given the status of the company prior to privatisation was a 
government department within the Ministry of Energy, Telecommunications 
and Posts.  
 
The firm’s international expansion process does not see to be based just on 
government connections, but also upon its technological expertise, business 
networks with foreign partners, and knowledge and experience of developing-
country markets. Undoubtedly, the groups’ reputation as Malaysia national 
telecommunications firm increased its credibility in the eyes of its foreign 
partners. TMI’s primary motives for overseas expansions were to gain market 
presence by searching for new opportunities and establish regional coverage 
of operations. Regional economies which typically have high populations but 
low phone penetration rates remain the main focus of its international 
investments. The group believes most of its ventures are located in important 
growth regions in the industry, which have the potential to become fast 
growing markets. 
 
Some of the findings in this paper contradict prevailing misleading stereotypes 
in the developing-country MNCs literature that corporations from developing 
countries are inherently weak, their advantages derived from conventional 
cost savings and are labour intensive, often unable to compete internationally, 
and their internationalisation follows an incremental process. The evidence 
from the TM case shows that the group’s international expansion was 
facilitated through various types of ownership advantages such as knowledge 
and experience in the telecommunication industry, technological competence, 
and reputation of the firm as a government-linked corporation. The firm’s 
internationalisation process reflected opportunistic moves rather than being 
incremental in process and stages. The case study thus offers interesting 
insight into the birth, developmental process, and international expansion of a 
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